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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
TIM THEMY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
SEAGULL ENTERPRISES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, SHIRLEY 
K. WATSON, UNITED BANK, A 
STATE OF UTAH 
Utah corpora ti on, ZIONS FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK and MURRAY 
BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. , 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 15641 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Summary Judgment granted by 
the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, and entered in the above entitled 
action on November 2, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants Seagull Enterprises, Inc. ("Seagull"), 
Shirley K. Watson ("Watson") and Murray Broadcasting Company, 
Inc· ("Murray Broadcasting") have filed this appeal seeking 
reversal of a Summary Judgment entered by the trial court. It 
is respondent's position that the lower court's decision should 
be affirmed. 
r 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Generally, appellants' Statement of Facts is accura:' 
however, respondent believes that the Statement is over-long 
and contains irrelevant information. In determining whether 
the trial court correctly ruled that respondent was entitled tc 
summary judgment, it is sufficient to know the following facts: 
1. On June 26, 1974, the owner of the KMOR radio 
station, O. J. Wilkinson, entered into an agreement for sale o: 
the station, including its FCC license, broadcasting equipment, 
and several acres of land to Seagull. The agreement was 
evidenced by two written documents, each denominated as "Purd' 
Agreement". (See paragraphs 6 and 7 of Respondent's Amended 
Complaint (R. 70-71) and the Answers of Watson and Murray 
Broadcasting (R. 8 7) and of Seagull (R. 9 9) . ) The agreements 
were drafted by Seagull's attorneys. (R. 327.) 
2. Both Agreements, which obviously drew heavily 
on the language of the standard Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
provided for forfeiture in the event of buyer's default (R. 1' 
17) . 
3. Subsequent to payment of the initial downpayroe: 
required under the two Agreements, Seagull made no further pa;' 
under the contract (See Respondent's Amended Complaint' para· 
( 99)) There is graph 10 (R. 72) and the Answer of Seagull R. 
no evidence that Seagull or any of its successors ever tender' 
e hl' 
any further payments under the contract; and indeed, ther 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been no such payments. In its memo in Support of Oral Argument 
(R. 145-150) Seagull freely conceded that it was in default under 
the Agreements. ( R. 14 5, first paragraph.) 
4. Because of Seagull's default under the Agreements, 
on September 4, 1975, Wilkinson served notice upon Jay Gardner, 
Seagull's process agent and Vice President, of his election as 
seller to treat Seagull's interest in the license and the real 
and personal property as having been forfeited. 
358-362.) 
(R. 309-310, 
5. On May 26, 1976, Wilkinson entered into an instal-
lment sale contract with respondent for sale of the real and 
personal property and the license. Wilkinson also assigned 
respondent his interest in the two Purchase Agreements with 
Seagull. (Deposition of Tim Themy (R. 283), pp. 7, 8, and 
Exhibits 1-4 attached thereto. ) 
6. On March 8, 1977, Seagull sold the FCC license and 
broadcasting equipment to Watson dba Murray Broadcasting Company 
(R. 313-314, 363-365, 393.) 
7. Watson subsequently sold the license and equipment 
to Murray Broadcasting under the terms of a "Proposal" dated 
April 16, 1977. (R. 415-416.) 
8. On September 2, 1977, respondent's counsel served a 
letter upon Mr. Gardner which confirmed the fact that respondent, 
as Wilkinson's assignee, intended to treat Seagull's default as a 
forfeiture. (R. 61 and unnumbered attachments filed with this 
court June 2 9 , 19 7 8 . ) 
-3-
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9. Based upon the foregoing facts and pursuant to 
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment the trial court enterec 
its judgment in favor of respondent on October 2 5, 1977. (R. 
173-174.} The Judgment provided that appellants' interest in 
the real and personal property and in the FCC license had been 
forfeited and that respondent was the owner thereof subject to 
the security interest of O. J. Wilkinson. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE ARE NO DISPUTED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
Predictably, appellants argue that entry of summary 
judgment against them was inappropriate because there existed 
disputed issues of material fact. The principal "disputed fac:' 
relied upon by appellants are as follows: 
A. THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT RESPONDENT IS TE 
SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE SELLER UNDER THE 
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS. 
Appellants state that "respondent's standing as the 
proper party plaintiff was a material fact as to which there wa 
a genuine dispute between the parties". This assertion is bet: 
by the deposition of Tim Themy (R. 283). (For reasons unknown· 
the parties to this action, Mr. Themy' s deposition was sealed' 
the time it was filed with this court. However, by an order 
dated August 10, 1978, the deposition was unsealed and publish' 
An examination of Mr. Themy' s deposition shows the following: 
-4-
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a) By a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated May 26, 
1976, respondent contracted to purchase the real and personal 
property and the FCC license, all of which are the subject 
matter of this lawsuit, from O. J. Wilkinson. 
p. 7 and Exhibit 1.) 
(Themy Deposition, 
b) By an Assignment of the same date Wilkinson 
also assigned his interest in the Purchase Agreement for sale 
of the broadcasting equipment and FCC license as well as his 
interest in the license and personal property to respondent. 
(Themy Deposition, p. 18 and Exhibit 2.) 
c) Subsequently, by Assignment dated July 6, 1977, 
Mr. Wilkinson also assigned his interest in the Purchase 
Agreement for sale of the real property to respondent. 
~position, p. 20 and Exhibit 4.) 
(Themy 
Since appellants have produced no evidence contra-
dieting respondent's claim to be Wilkinson's successor, the 
court's apparent recognition of this fact was correct. 
The above facts were specifically cited in respondent's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted below in support 
of his Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 163, 1J 6.) Appellants 
at that time neither objected to respondents use of the Themy 
deposition, nor attempted to place in issue the truthfulness of 
the testimony contained therein. Appellants may not now on 
appeal for the first time raise the issue of the sufficiency of 
the deposition. This principal has been recognized by this court 
-5-
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on several occasions. See, for example, Meyer v. Deluke, 23~ 
2d 24, 457 P.2d 966, 969 (1969) and Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 
314, 313 P.2d 465, 468, (1957). 
Quite apart from the Themy deposition, respondent's 
interest in the Purchase Agreements was also demonstrated by 
the Affidavit of Steven H. Gunn (R. 161) to which were attachf: 
the Contract and Assignments found also in the Themy depositic: 
Thus the court had ample evidence of respondent's interest. 
Appellants also contend that prior to consummation 
of the transaction between respondent and O. J. Wilkinson, Mr. 
Wilkinson assigned his interest in the Purchase Agreement to 
Zions First National Bank. (See appellants' discussion of thi 0 
point at pages 12 and 13 of their Brief.) While no authority -
cited for this proposition, appellants apparently make referer.: 
to an assignment dated August 3, 1976, wherein o. J. Wilkinson 
assigned his interest in the Purchase Agreement relating to 
real property to Zions First National Bank to secure payment 
of a Trust Deed Note. (Themy Deposition, Exhibit s.) Since 
the Assignment in question relates only to the Purchase Agreer: 
as to the real property, but makes no reference to the compan: 
Agreement for sale of the license, appellants are certainly 
incorrect in asserting that the broadcasting equipment and tr.: 
FCC license are in any way affected. In any case, since the 
Assignment is not absolute, but rather was given for the purp: 
of securing payment of an obligation owed by Wilkinson to t~ 
-6-
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sank, it does not demonstrate that Wilkinson divested himself of 
all interest in the Purchase Agreements prior to his Assignments 
to respondent. 
Appellants play a final novel variation on this same 
theme when they contend that under the Agreement once the FCC 
approved transfer of the license to Seagull, Wilkinson relinquished 
all interest therein. (See Appellants' Brief, pp. 14-15.) 
Appellants cite no evidence in support of this proposition. 
Indeed, they did not even bother to raise the issue below. Thus, 
their right to rely on this theory appears to have been waived. 
Heyer v. Del uke, and Radley v. Smith, supra. 
But even if this issue had been timely raised, it is 
unsupported by any reasonable reading of the Purchase Agreements. 
While the terms of the sale of the KMOR radio station 
were contained in two separate Purchase Agreements, it is clear 
that the sale was considered by the parties to be a single trans-
action. Thus, for example, the two Agreements contain cross-
default provisions. (See R. 11, ,I 10; R. 18, ,, 18.) It is 
similarly clear that the tangible assets of the station would be 
of minimal value standing alone without the broadcasting license. 
It is therefore ridiculous to contend, as appellants do, that the 
seller's remedies under the Agreements were terminated upon 
receipt of FCC approval of the transfer. To accept this view is 
to accept the proposition that the seller actually intended to 
sen the station for the amount of the downpayment. 
-7-
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Furthermore, appellants' theory is directly contradk~ 
by the Agreements themselves which state: 
In the event of a failure to comply with the terms 
hereof by the Buyer or upon failure of Buyer to 
make any payment or payments when the same shall 
become due or within 90 days thereafter, the Seller, 
at his option shall have the following alternative 
remedies 
(R. 10, 17.) 
According to this provision the seller's remedies 
may be exercised at any time subsequent to ninety days after 
default. But if appellants' interpretation were adopted, the 
buyer would be without remedy as to a default in the license 
Purchase Agreement once FCC approval had been obtained. There 
is nothing in the Agreements to indicate that this was the intr 
of the parties. 
B. RESPONDENT PROPERLY INVOKED THE FORFEITURE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PURCHASE AGREEMENTS. 
On September 1, 1977, respondent's counsel delivered 
a notice of default to Jay Gardner, a vice president of Seagul 
Enterprises, and station manager of the KRPQ radio station 
operated by Murray Broadcasting. The letter, which was addres' 
to Seagull Enterprises, stated: 
Because of some confusion which appears to exist 
as to ownership of the seller's interest under 
the Purchase Agreements dated June 26, 1974, and 
as to the exercise of the seller's remedies under 
these Agreements, we hereby give you notice of 
the following: 
First, our client, Tim Themy, has purchasedcr.e 
the seller's interest under the contracts. Att~ r· 
to this letter, you will find copies of the ass 10 ' 
ments to Mr. Themy. 
-8-
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Second, Mr. Wilkinson, the original seller, 
has already notified you of his election to treat 
the default in payment as a forfeiture of Seagull's 
interest in the real and personal property and in 
the FCC license. You are hereby notified that Mr. 
Themy has also elected to treat Seagull's default 
as a forfeiture. However, because of conflicting 
information as to the alleged waiver of Mr. Wilkinson's 
earlier notice, Mr. Themy has agreed to give you 
five days from the day of this notice to remedy 
the deficiency by bringing all payments current. 
As of August 1, 1977, the balance due under both 
contracts is $120,951.66. This notice is not 
intended to waive any of our client's rights 
under the earlier notice. 
Third, we do not make demand upon you at 
this time to vacate the real property. However, 
your vacating of the property may be required at 
such time in the future as will best protect 
our client from loss of the FCC license. Mr. 
Themy's failure at this time to reenter the 
property is not intended as a waiver of his 
right to exercise such right of reentry in 
the future. 
Finally, Mr. Themy hereby reconfirms the 
earlier Notice of Default and Intent to Foreclose 
which was served upon you. We still intend to 
pursue this remedy in the event that the court 
proves unwilling to enforce the seller's for-
feiture remedy. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ 
(R. 161, as supplemented by the attachments subsequently filed 
with this court on June 29, 1978, pursuant to court order.) 
As indicated in the above letter, prior to service 
of the above notice, on September 9, 1975, O. J. Wilkinson had 
also served Notice of default and intent to seek forfeiture 
uf Seayull's interests under the Purchase Agreements. Copies 
of these notices may be found at pages 358 and 361 of the 
Record. 
-9-
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Appellants contend that the earlier notices sent by 
Wilkinson had no legal affect, because Wilkinson allegedly "~ 
sequently waived his forfeiture remedy. Whatever the trutho'. 
such an allegation may be, it is clear that respondent, as 
successor in interest to Wilkinson, by his letter of September 
1, 1977, revoked any such waiver and re-invoked the forfeiture 
remedy earlier relied upon by Wilkinson. 
Furthermore, the notice of September 1, 1977, stand: 
alone is legally sufficient to invoke the forfeiture reme~~ 
the Purchase Agreements. In pertinent part, the Agreements pr 
as follows: 
DEFAULT OF BUYER. In the event of a failure 
to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, 
or upon failure of the Buyer to make any payment 
or payments when the same shall become due, or 
within 90 days or after, the Seller, at his 
option shall have the following alternative 
remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right upon failure 
of the Buyer to remedy the default within five 
days after written notice, to be released from 
all obligations in law and in equity to convey 
said property, and all payments which have been 
made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, 
shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated 
damages for the non-performance of the contra~t, 
and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his. 
option reenter and take possession of said prem~ 
without legal processes as in its first and fo~m~r .. 
estate, together with all improvements and ':1d~1t10·· 
made by the Buyer thereon, and the said add1t1on5 • 
and improvements shall remain with the land, becoro: 
property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at 
once a tenant at will of the Seller . 
(R. 10, 17.) 
It should be noted that the above provision requir• 
only the giving of "written notice" followed by a five d~' 
-10-
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period for the remedying of the alleged breach. No special re-
quirements concerning the writing are imposed by the Agreements. 
Appellants contend that respondent's Notice was 
deficient because 1) It was served subsequent to institution 
of the proceedings below; 2) It was addressed to Seagull -- but 
not to Watson and Murray Broadcasting; 3) It fails to indicate 
that Seller was released from all obligations under the contracts; 
4) It fails to advise that the purchaser had become a tenant 
at will; and 5) It reconfirmed the fact that respondent intended 
to treat the agreement as a mortgage and to foreclose thereon 
in the event the court failed to grant forfeiture. 
Appellants, p. 18.) 
(Brief of 
In considering these allegations, it is important 
that the court understand that at no time in the proceedings 
below did appellants ever challenge the legal sufficiency of 
the notice of September 1, 1977. (See, for example, the Memo-
randum of appellant Seagull in opposition to respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, R. 145-147 and the Memorandum of appellants 
Watson and Murray Broadcasting in support of their Petition to 
Reform the lower court's summary judgment, R. 176-178.) Thus, 
under the rule in Meyer v. Deluke, supra, this issue may not 
now be raised for the first time on appeal. 
In any case, appellants' arguments as to the sufficiency 
of the Notice are clearly erroneous. Respondent will consider 
these allegations in the order presented in appellants' Brief. 
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Timing of the Notice 
Appellants contend that because the Notice was 
served after commencement of this action, it was invalid. No 
authority has been presented for this dubious proposition. 
Indeed, respondent knows of no such authority. Since the Pfilc 
Agreements require only the giving of notice, without refern: 
to any legal action, respondent respectfully suggests that it< 
notice fulfills the requirements of the contracts. 
Lack of Service Upon Watson and Murray Broadcasting 
Watson and Murray Broadcasting were not parties to 
the Purchase Agreements. Those contracts require only the gi 
of written notice to the buyer (Seagull). Under the contract 
therefore, it was not necessary to notify any successor in 
interest of the buyer. Furthermore, since the Notice was se: 
upon Jay Gardner, a manager employed by Murray Broadcasting, 
the offices of Murray Broadcasting, it can hardly be said tt' 
Murray Broadcasting and Mrs. Watson, the president of the co: 
poration, were without notice of the receipt of respondent': 
letter. Indeed, neither Watson nor Murray Broadcasting has 
alleged that it was without notice. 
The Notice Contents 
Appellants allege that the notice was insufficie' 
, (I 
because it failed to inform them that by virtue of the inv 
h .I 
of the forfeiture remedy, they were tenants at will and ta 
all Seller under the Purchase Agreements was released from 
obligations thereunder. Since the Agreements themselves ar 
-12-
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silent as to the contents of the notice, it is difficult to 
understand wherein appellants find such a requirement. Respon-
dent has been unable to find any statute which relates to this 
question. In addition, in no opinion of this court of which 
respondent is aware has it ever been required that the seller 
give the type of information suggested by appellants. On the 
contrary, in Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 
195 P.2d 748 (1948) the court quoted with approval the language 
of a notice given by a seller in invoking the forfeiture remedy 
of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. In pertinent part the letter 
stated that the purchaser was in default in a specified sum and 
that unless the buyer corrected the deficiency within the pre-
scribed time "the seller elects to declare said contract forfeited 
in accordance with the terms thereof." Id. at 749. Since 
respondent's letter also gives notice of the default, lists the 
amount of the delinquency, sets forth the time within which the 
deficiency must be remedied, and states that respondent elects 
the forfeiture remedy, it clearly meets the requirements of 
Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, supra. 
Election of Remedies 
The notice of September 1, 1977, makes reference to 
the fact that respondent, if unsuccessful in obtaining forfeiture, 
would seek foreclosure. Such a statement can hardly be said to 
,I constitute an election of the foreclosure remedy. On the contrary' 
the notice makes it clear that the foreclosure remedy will only be 
-13-
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resorted to if the court proves unwilling to enforce forfeiture, 
For the above reasons appellants are clearly in error 
when they state that a material issue of fact remains which coi. 
have prevented the lower court from entering summary judgment, 
POINT II 
THE COURTS OF THIS STATE HAVE THE 
POWER TO ADJUDICATE THIS CONTROVERSY 
In points I and II of their Brief, appellants in vari: 
contexts raise the question of whether the courts of this State 
may adjudicate a controversy relating to the disposition of ~ 
FCC license. This was also essentially the only issue raised 
by appellants below. (See Watson's and Murray Broadcasting's 
Memorandum in Support of Petition (R. 176-178.).) Rather than 
replying to this issue in a disjointed fashion respondent will 
treat it as a separate point in this Brief. 
In considering this issue it must be understood that 
disposition of an FCC license has really two facets. First, 
there is typically an agreement between the seller or assignor 
of the license and the buyer/assignee. Second, any transfer c: 
the license is subject to FCC approval. In objecting to the 
ruling of the lower court, appellants choose to focus upon tr« 
fact that any attempt to transfer the license in this case to 
respondent or his nominee is subject to FCC approval. Th~ 
point out, quite correctly, that no state court can order t~ 
FCC to approve such transfer. Thus, in Radio Station wo0 
v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 65 s. Ct. 1475, 89 L. Ed. 2092 (lq; 
the Supreme Court held that a state court decision had excee; 
-14-
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the jurisdiction of that court by requiring the parties to "do 
all the things necessary to secure a return of the license". 
l'L._ at 2101. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the trial court's 
order that the physical facilities of the station be retransfered 
to the lessor/plaintiff, because of fraud in the inducement in 
the underlying contract. In defining the powers of the state 
court the Supreme Court stated: 
We have no doubt of the power of the Nebraska 
Court to adjudicate, and conclusively, the 
claim of fraud in the transfer of the station 
by the [plaintiff] to [defendant] and upon 
finding fraud to direct a reconveyance of the 
lease to the [plaintiff]. And this, even though 
the property consists of license facilities and 
the [plaintiff] chooses not to apply for re-
transfer of the radio license to it, or the 
Commission, upon such application, refuses the 
retransfer. The result may well be the termina-
tion of the broadcasting station. Id. at 2101. 
Similarly·, in Regents of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 
U.S. 586, 70 S. Ct. 370, 94 L. Ed. 363 (1949), the Supreme 
Court affirmed the validity of a contract of purchase between 
the licensee and the owner of the station, even though the FCC 
had required the licensee to disaffirm the contract as a pre-
condition to renewal of the license. In affirming the lower 
court's decision the court stated: 
J_Ll_, at 374. 
The Commission may impose on an applicant 
conditions which it must meet before it will 
grant a license, but the imposition of the. 
conditions cannot directly affect the appl1~ 
cant's responsibility to a third party dealing 
with the applicant. 
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r: 
f 
f' 
The case of Stenger v. Stenger Broadcasting Corp~­
tion , et al, 28 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1939), contains a c~~ 
statement as to the relationship between the courts and the 
Federal Communications Commission concerning the disposition c· 
a broadcasting license. There the purchaser of the assets of 
the station, including the license, had sought specific pe~ 
formance of the contract of purchase in the state court. The 
purchaser also obtained an injunction preventing the license 
holder from assigning the license to third parties. In respor.: 
the licensee brought an action in the Federal District Court t: 
require the purchaser to return management and control of the 
station to him. The purchaser moved to dismiss the Federal 
action. In ruling on this motion the court stated: 
The fact that the subject of these contracts 
is a radio station, which must be operated in 
accordance with the terms of the [Federal 
Communications] Act, is merely incidental. No 
ground for Federal jurisdiction is alleged and 
no Federal question is raised. This aspect of 
the case is simply a matter of interpreting 
and enforcing a contract, and this can be 
accomplished through the equity proceedings 
which are now pending in the [state court]. 
Id. at 408. 
The rule which thus emerges from these decisions is 
that in any transaction dealing with the sale or assignment~ 
an FCC license, the courts are free to determine the relative 
rights of the parties including the "ownership" of the licen5' 
However, the ultimate decision as to whether or not a license· 
be transferred rests with the Federal communications commissi: 
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Thus, one seeking to rescind, reform, invalidate, or specifically 
enforce a contract for sale of an FCC license must obtain the 
appropriate relief in the courts and then seek confirmation of 
the relief by the Conunission. This conclusion is supported by 
the FCC itself. In a letter dated May 14, 1976, over the signa-
ture of Wallace D. Johnson, Chief, Broadcast Bureau, Federal 
Communications Conunission, the position of the Conunission was 
summarized as follows: 
(R. 149.) 
[T]he Conunission has consistently held that it is 
not the proper forum for the resolution of private 
contractual disputes • • • "Thus as a long-standing 
policy, the Conunission does not assume jurisdiction 
in contractual or debtor-creditor controversies 
involving broadcast licenses, recognizing that such 
matters are generally private in nature and appro-
priately left to the local courts for resolution. 
In the instant action, the court below in its summary 
judgment of October 25, 1977, held as follows: 
(R. 173.) 
The interests of defendants Seagull Enterprises, 
Inc., Shirley K. Watson, United Bank and of Murray 
Broadcasting Company, Inc. in the FCC license 
described in and arising out of the Purchase 
Agreement for sale of the broadcasting equipment 
and license dated June 26, 1974, are forfeited 
by virtue of the default of the buyer thereunder. 
Plaintiff is the owner of such interests subject 
to the security interest of O. J. Wilkinson. 
By its ruling the court attempted only to determine 
the contractual rights of the parties under the Purchase Agree-
ment. The Court did not attempt in any way to require the 
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Federal Communications Commission to approve transfer of the 
license to plaintiff; nor did it attempt to require appella~s 
to undertake such a transfer. The judgment entered below is 
therefore clearly within the recognized powers of a court to 
determine the rights or the parties to a contract relating to 
an FCC license. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, Regents of 
Georgia v. Carroll, supra. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE IS IN HARMONY 
WITH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT IN SIMILAR ACTIC 
Point II of appellants' brief is devoted to the pro-
position that "the lower court erroneously forfeited appellant 
interest in and to the prior payments made prior to the 
Purchase Agreements .•. " {Appellants' Brief, p. 19.) 
Appellants point to statements by this Court that forfeiture 
provisions will not be enforced if they constitute a penalty, 
and from this rule conclude that the lower court erred in 
granting forfeiture in the instant case. 
Appellants' argument appears to be based upon a 
misapprehension of both the facts of this case and of the la\'. 
A careful analysis of Utah Supreme Court decisions relating t: 
forfeitures under installment sale contracts reveals that sue' 
forfeitures have a dual impact. Typically, the party to the 
contract seeking forfeiture seeks not only a forfeiture of 
the defaulting party's interest in the property described in 
the contract, but also a forfeiture of all payments under the 
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contract. The issue of unconscionability raised in such 
cases inevitably goes to the question of whether the seller will 
be allowed to keep all or a portion of sums previously paid by 
the buyer. See, for example, Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 
(Utah 1977), and Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976). 
The issue of unconscionability may be raised by the 
buyer in the form of a suit to recover sums previously paid 
under the contract, Johnson v. Carman, supra, or as an affirma-
tively pleaded defense in an action brought by the seller. 
Fullmer v. Blood, supra. While this court on occasion has found 
that forfeiture payments made by the buyer would be unconscionable 
(Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 474, 243 P.2d 446 (1952)), respon-
dent has found no Utah case where the court, having determined 
that the forfeiture remedy was properly invoked, refused to 
recognize forfeiture of the buyer's interest in the property. 
Accordingly, there is no support in Utah law for appellants' 
assertion that the alleged unconscionability should result in 
a reversal of the trial court. 
Notwithstanding appellants' assertion that the trial 
court decreed forfeiture of the $79,000 downpayrnent paid by 
appellants too. J. Wilkinson, an examination of the Summary 
Judgment reveals that, the court did not address itself to this 
question. The Judgment simply states that appellants' interest 
in the real and personal property and in the FCC license was 
forfeited. Thus, appellants' reliance on such cases as Perkins v. 
~, supra, is misplaced. If appellants believe that they 
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are entitled to return of their downpayment, they may bring an 
action against Wilkinson. But the issue of unconscionabili~~: 
no relevance in the instant case. 
A further weakness in appellants' argument lies in U.: 
fact that the issue of unconscionabili ty was not raised below--
either in the context of appellants' pleadings or as an argumen: 
in the proceedings relating to respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Thus, under the rule that a new theory may not be 
raised for the first time upon appeal, appellants' argument mus: 
be disregarded. Meyer v. Deluke, supra. 
Finally, respondent wishes to point out to this court 
that appellants at no time attempted by affidavit or otherwise 
to demonstrate that forfeiture of its $79,000 downpayrnent wou!C 
be unconscionable. Indeed, in view of the fact that appellants 
had use of the FCC license and had the possession and use of L 
broadcasting equipment and real property from the date of the 
Agreements (June 26, 1974), to the present, forfeiture of the 
downpayment can hardly be said to be unconscionable. 
POINT IV 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT EXCEED THE RELIEF 
PRAYED FOR IN RESPONDENT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Appellants state in Point III of their Brief that 
the forfeiture of the FCC license declared by the court in iU 
Summary Judgment was inconsistent with the relief prayed for i: 
respondent's Amended Complaint. Respondent confesses that he 
is at a loss to understand the nature of appellants' objection 
The relevant prayer in plaintiff's Amended Complaint states: 
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(R. 75.) 
Wherefore, plaintiff prays for a declaratory 
injunction (sic) determining plaintiff to be 
the equita~le owner of the license and equip-
ment described above and further adjudging 
defendants Seagull, Watson, United Bank and 
Murray Broadcasting Company to be without 
interest therein. 
While it may perhaps be argued that reference in 
the prayer to a "declaratory injunction" rather than to a 
"declaratory judgment" may be somewhat misleading, prior reference 
in paragraph 26 of the Amended Complaint to Utah's Declaratory 
Judgment Act, sections 78-33-1, et seq., made it clear that 
respondent sought a declaratory judgment concerning the rights 
of the parties under the Purchase Agreements. 
Similarly, it is clear that the court is empowered 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act to grant the relief requested. 
Section 2 of that Act states: 
Any person interested under a . • • written 
contract . • • may have determined any question 
of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument . . . and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
Section 78-33-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
Since respondent, by his Amended Complaint sought a 
determination as to his rights and the rights of appellants under 
the Purchase Agreements, and since the Summary Judgment made a 
determination as to those rights, the court clearly acted 
properly. 
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Appellants also see some significance in the fact 
that in his Third Claim for Relief respondent prayed for the 
issuance of a mandatory injunction requiring appellants to 
assist respondent in obtaining transfer of the FCC license. 
Appellants point out (probably correctly) that such relief, •. 
granted, would be in violation of the rule laid down by the 
Supreme Court in Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, ~tr.: 
a court may not force an unsuccessful litigant to cooperate i: 
divesting itself of its license. However, since the lower 
court did not grant the mandatory injunction prayed for, the 
question is, at best, academic. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR APPOINT?1ENT OF A RECEIVER 
By an Order dated March 16, 1978, the lower comt 
appointed a receiver of the real and personal property and o: 
the broadcasting license. The order empowered the receivert 
take control of the station and to seek FCC approval for re-
transfer of the broadcasting license to respondent or his no~­
Appellants argue that the establishment of the receivership 
exceeds the power of the court and intrudes upon the power 0' 
the Federal Communications Commission. Neither of these 
arguments is tenable. 
Rule 66 (Receivers), Utah Rules of Civil Procedur: 
states in pertinent part: 
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(a) Grounds for Appointment. A receiver may 
be appointed by the court in which an action 
is pending or has passed to judgment: 
(3) After judgment to carry the judgment into 
effect. 
(4) After judgment, to dispose of the property 
according to the judgment, or to preserve it 
during the pendency of an appeal, or in pro-
ceedings in aid of execution when an execution 
has been returned unsatisfied, or when the 
judgment debtor refuses to apply his property 
in satisfaction of the judgment. 
Since the Summary Judgment of October 25, 1977, 
forfeited appellants' interest in the property and license and 
recognized respondent as the owner of that property and the 
license, it is clear that the subsequent appointment of a 
receiver for the benefit of respondent was simply intended to 
carry the judgment into effect, and that the Order was therefore 
within the authorization of Rule 66(a) (3). 
Furthermore, inasmuch as appellants appealed from the 
Summary Judgment, it is manifest that Rule 66(~) (4) permits the 
appointment of a receiver during the pendency of their appeal. 
Thus, the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly empowered the trial 
court to establish a receivership in this case. 
While not apparently denying this fact, appellants 
argue that the receivership was unnecessary, since "respondent 
in his own name and on his own behalf, may apply to the Commission 
for retransfer of the subject broadcasting license without the 
intervention of a third party receiver." (Brief of Appellants, 
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p. 26.) Thus, appellants apparently would not object if 
respondent were to seize the real and personal property and 
broadcasting license, but object to a procedure whereby the 
property and license is seized by a receiver for the benefit 
of respondent. 
As a practical matter, respondent wishes to inform 
this court of his understanding that FCC rules require that an 
involuntary transfer of a broadcasting license be accomplished 
by means of the use of a receiver. This procedure has receivec 
tacit approval by at least one court. In LaRose v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 494 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia acknowle: 
the propriety of the appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy 
to take transfer of an FCC license and to sell it (subject to 
FCC approval) to a third party. The court does not appear to 
have been concerned with the question of whether such an 
involuntary transfer to a receiver was valid, but rather 
addressed itself to the question of whether, having rejected 
one potential buyer, the FCC was required to consider a second 
application initiated by the receiver. Nonetheless, the decis: 
demonstrates the court's attitude of approval concerning the 
involuntary transfer of an FCC license to a receiver. 
· h · · t shoulQ Apart from this benefit of a receivers ip, i 
1 b . . dd 1 abando: a so e pointed out that if appellants were to su en Y 
the use of the license, a receiver would be clothed with t~ 
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power to resume operation of the station without immediate 
danger of loss of the license. 
But in the last analysis, whether or not an involuntary 
transfer can be accomplished directly or only through a receiver 
is irrelevant. The FCC can surely make its own determination. 
The only question with which this Court need be concerned is 
whether under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the establishment 
of a receivership was justified. Since Rule 66, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, clearly provides a basis for the granting of 
the receivership, any arguments as to the necessity of such a 
receivership for the purpose of obtaining an involuntary transfer 
are irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding appellants' obfuscations it is clear 
that the facts upon which the trial court granted respondent's 
Summary Judgment remain undisputed. These facts are as follows: 
a. There was a valid contract between the parties to 
the Purchase Agreements. 
b. Plaintiff has succeeded to the interest of the 
seller; appellants Watson and Murray Broadcasting to the interest 
of the buyer. 
c. There was a default under the contract which was 
never remedied. 
d. The contract provided for forfeiture in the event 
of default. 
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e. Respondent properly invoked his right of for-
feiture. 
Thus the lower court's Summary Judgment was appropria-
But there is an equitable aspect to this case which 
respondent has not emphasized in replying to appellants' argu-
ments. Both appellants and respondent have contracted with 
O. J. Wilkinson to purchase the radio station. Appellants 
have taken possession of the station and have operated it for 
several years without making any payments under their contract. 
They have not even offered to make such payments. Instead, 
they brazenly inform the courts of this state that they are 
without power to punish or remedy the breach. 
By contrast, respondent who has faithfully performed 
his contract has nothing. Respondent respectfully petitions 
this Court to rectify this injustice by affirming the lower 
court's judgment. 
DATED this /$rday of August, 1978. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
the foregoing '~ I hereby certify that two copies of 
delivered to GARY A. FRANK, attorney for Appellants, by 
· copy of the same in the U. S. Mails, postage depositing a 
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